

Election Rules Review

**A review and assessment of the election rules in the United States and
selected countries world-wide**



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Gary Meyers

Lincolnshire, IL 60069

Direct: (224) 715-5555

Email: Gary@Meyers-Group.com

<https://meyersreport.news/>



Executive Summary

Why we did this survey

There have long been reports of United States (US) election system anomalies that could affect the outcomes of state and national elections. As a result, a significant portion of the public has lost confidence in the integrity of the United States election systems. The US General Accounting Office (GAO) report 20-267 released in 2020 cited multiple threats to the United States election processes and outcomes. We decided to conduct a survey of election rules from a global perspective and compare them according to established risk management principles.

What we included

To determine if election systems are secure, we analyzed current rules (election laws and policies) of the United States (all electoral college entities including the 50 states and the District of Columbia (DC)) as well as the rules of 36 countries spanning six continents. These rules were based on published election laws, policies, processes, and procedures. This is a survey of the rules as of the date of publication and does not address compliance of the rules or auditing of the processes/procedures.

Our methodology

We selected a subset of 17 election risk areas based on inputs from subject matter experts (SMEs). These SMEs nominated the risk areas based on reviews of prior election survey reports, US national voting standards guidelines, current survey reports from other organizations, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) US election model, and a review of security controls for election-related security domains such as cybersecurity.

We developed a scoring system based on previous surveys, and applied weighting factors based on the risk importance of each of the 17 areas. Each country and US entity (state, DC) was assigned a score (on a scale of 0 to 100) based on their level of compliance with election best practices. These practices were derived from recommendations of many election integrity groups, as well as commission findings and US Election Assistance Commission (EAC) guidelines.

Our findings

US state scores ranged from 30 (Nevada) to 83 (Mississippi). The average score was 59.82 points, with a median of 63. The standard deviation was 13.20, indicating a wide disparity among states. As a whole, the US state average was 21.35 points below the average of the 36 other nations surveyed. The scores of the other 36 countries ranged from 60 (Germany) to 95 (Kenya). The average score was 81.19 points, with a median of 84. The standard deviation was 8.99, indicating a small disparity among countries.



The lower compliance score for the US combined with the wider spread among states suggests an inconsistent implementation of election safeguards among states. It highlights the consequences of minimum Federal security standards. The lack of a minimal Federal compliance standard allows compromised election integrity in low scoring states, which can directly impact all electors in the other states, and affect national election outcomes.

Our analysis

To identify the root causes of the poor election compliance scores, we conducted a causal analysis. The findings indicate that some election systems were deliberately designed to allow manipulation of vote totals, enabling bad actors to secure victories for preferred candidates rather than reflecting the will of the voters.

Whether intentional or not, election rules in poorly scoring states are uniquely designed to produce the outcomes observed. The causes could be due to a lack of maturity in developing the rules, conscious decisions to weaken the security of elections, or a lack of actions to measure, improve or correct rules and standardize them across all states.

What we recommend

- Develop a standard method of objective risk assessment for all election systems based on a comprehensive risk management framework (RMF) covering every step of the election process. Utilize an election model based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
- Use the election RMF to conduct risk assessments of all states, territories and DC to identify compliance gaps in the laws and policies/procedures as well as their implementation at the state, county and precinct levels.
- Determine the minimum standard (appetite) for risk to secure election systems.
- Develop recommendations for improvement for the election compliance areas. Provide these recommendations to all states to allow them the opportunity to improve their compliance score.
- Codify the election RMF in a federal statute, or in the interim as an Executive Order.
- Develop and implement methods for assessment, identification, improvement, and authorization for all election risks, similar to the current NIST cybersecurity RMF.
- Develop independent auditing procedures to provide periodic audits of election processes and activities. This will provide for accreditation of state systems in accordance with compliance standards.
- Establish state election process accreditation and authorization standards.



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
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1. Introduction

Since the advent of electronic voting following the passage of the Federal Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002, there have been reports of election system anomalies that could have affected the outcomes of state and national elections. Because of the large number and types of voting anomalies, a significant portion of the public lost confidence in the integrity of the United States election systems. One such report is GAO 20-267 published on February 6, 2020. The report cited multiple threats to the election process.



Source: GAO analysis based on information reported by the Department of Homeland Security, the Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and the Center for Internet Security. | GAO-20-267

Figure 1 US Election system processes

One solution to this issue is to follow best practices that have been proven over time for other similar systems. These practices exist for the key domains and components of our election systems. Because elections (state, local, and federal) are administered by the states, it is the responsibility of each individual state to ensure that risk has been identified and mitigated for all components of their election systems. (Note: when state is mentioned, it includes all 50 states and the District of Columbia.)

To evaluate the security of election systems, our study followed the scientific method to answer a central question: “**Are elections secure?**” We began by conducting background research on the laws and policies governing election systems in both the United States and selected foreign countries. This comparative analysis enabled us to develop a hypothesis about potential vulnerabilities in election systems and identify strategies to strengthen their security.



To test the hypothesis, we analyzed current laws and policies and compared them with current best practices for each security domain. The six election systems security domains include Physical Security, Information Security, Personnel Security, Supply Chain Security, Chain of Custody, and Threat Management. These domains are universally accepted for mission assurance in the US Department of Defense and other mission assurance organizations. Based on an analysis of the critical election system processes, we developed a set of controls to mitigate weaknesses in election systems processes. The control questions are based on the NIST standards for risk management, including the SP800 series of guidance documents. These controls were then peer reviewed by subject matter experts against domain standards to ensure a high level of maturity in the assessment process.

Election processes of the Federal government, 50 states and the District of Columbia, and 36 countries were reviewed based on published election rules (laws and policies/procedures). Each entity (state and country) was assigned a score based on the level of compliance with the best practice for critical election system processes.

The research data was then analyzed by an independent peer review to validate procedures, data accuracy and subsequent analyses. The findings were published along with a root cause analysis of weaknesses, and our recommended opportunities for improvement to mitigate the election risk areas.

Note: This report was created, executed, and funded internally by The Meyers Report and its members. The report does not have an agenda. It is not sponsored or funded by any other organization or political group.

Note: This report is about elections for national office and does not consider state and local elections, which often have different rules. The information gathered during the research process was taken from a variety of sources which were deemed reliable. We cannot guarantee the accuracy, completeness, consistency, or reliability of the source information in all cases. (See the bibliography.) The sources are provided in case the reader would like to research the source material.

Respectfully,

Gary Meyers, Barry Chapman, Jay Delancy, Edie Meyers



2. Methodology

2.1 Concept

We decided to use a methodology based on the following concepts:

- The Scientific Method
- Structured Analytic Techniques for data analysis
- Standards, including Risk Management Frameworks and best practices
- Use of concepts developed for prior election rules analysis
- Use of statistics and graphical displays to present the findings

1. Observe and question (scientific method step 1)

We observed the state of election rules (laws and procedures) in the United States and noticed a wide variety of rules from state to state and even at the County and local levels. We reviewed similar efforts to survey election rules, including the following: (a) the 2005 Carter-Baker Commission report that reviewed election rules for the US and several countries, and (b) the Heritage Foundation report that conducted state surveys of rules along 14 risk areas and found a wide range of compliance scores with respect to risk management.

2. Conduct research

Our observations led us to a finding that the US National election system had a high degree of risk due to poor rules in some states. We decided to conduct additional research on 17 election rules areas and assign scores for each area for each state. A scoring system was developed based on a risk assessment of the impact a noncompliant rule would have on election results. This system was based on current risk management frameworks for the election domains, such as the NIST cybersecurity framework (SP 800 series).

3. Develop a hypothesis

We developed a hypothesis that failure to properly address risk in a state election system could lead to weaknesses that could be exploited by bad actors. These weaknesses, or gaps, could result in an incorrect election result. This hypothesis was confirmed by the US General Accounting Office Report GAO 20-267 published on February 6, 2020.

4. Test with experiment

We tested our hypothesis by reviewing election rules of 36 countries on six continents and comparing their scores to the US states. Researchers in different countries reviewed rules from published sources to gather the data for analysis. We used the Delphi method to employ



geographically dispersed analysts to reduce confirmation bias and allow discussion of observations from different perspectives.

5. Analyze the data

The data from 51 US entities and 36 countries were analyzed. We used structured analytic techniques and System 2 thinking to conduct the analysis. This included the following: (1) Gather and analyze data. (2) Look for relationships in the data and use the Delphi method to bring in geographical diverse analysis. (3) Assess the possibility of deception, using tools to detect propaganda and reduce confirmation bias. (4) Develop conclusions and courses of action by quantitative analysis using scoring and statistics. (5) Use causal analysis to determine the gaps and root causes that drive the recommendations. (6) Present the data in a visual format, including charts, graphs, and tables.

6. Develop conclusions and report

We developed conclusions based on our observations of the data and used statistical tools and graphs to present the data for review. 87 entities were reviewed across 17 domains, with scoring set for a range of 0 to 100 based; the lowest compliance equals 0 and highest compliance equals 100.

7. Follow-on recommendations

This includes any additional research identified as a part of this survey, including correlating risk scores to political control, predicting risk based on likelihood of intent, and any additional research required to confirm the root cause analysis, including fishbone diagrams.

2.2 Premise and Procedures

The following survey examines written election rules for all 50 US states and the District of Columbia and compares those rules to those of 36 other countries in Western and Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia, South America, and Pacific Oceania (including Australia). The countries selected were chosen for size, geographic diversity, their political relevance, and with The Meyers Report (TMR) having overseas contacts who assisted with the verification of survey data and its interpretation.

This is a study of “election rules” only. The study does not consider whether the US states and the selected countries implement and enforce their own rules. It does not survey if election processes are audited or observed by independent organizations.



“Best practice” election process

Our definition of a “best practice” election process comes from a combination of findings in the 2005 Carter-Baker Commission report along with the common public practices generally complied with by 75% or more of the countries surveyed. The Carter-Baker Commission warned that the two greatest dangers to the American election system were mail-in ballots and the lack of voter identification. These two areas were given a higher weighting due to their importance.

Premise

A best practice election system has the following characteristics:

- The consistent chain of custody is never broken.
- Only citizens should be eligible and allowed to vote.
- All voters should have a government photo ID that verifies the voter is the legal voter and is eligible to vote in a specific election in the appropriate voting district.
- Voters should have privacy so that they can be free to vote their conscience without intimidation or fear of repercussions on their lives.
- Election results should be timely and verifiable through recounts and audits.
- Voters should have access to voter roll lists at no cost or a reasonable cost.

Resolve

- Does the United States federal government have “best practice election procedures?”
- Do all 50 US states including the District of Columbia have consistent “best practice election procedures?”
- How do the election laws of the US and those of the individual states compare to each other and other countries in the world?

The study employed the following procedures for data gathering and verification for accuracy.

1. Criteria for election procedures

These criteria were selected by election experts in the United States and in other countries in Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia.

Surveyed areas of risk:

From the above premises, the following election risk areas were chosen for survey.

1. Citizen-Only Voting
2. SDR (Same Day Registration) Voting
3. Ranked Choice Voting
4. In-person Early Voting Days



5. Mail-in Ballots Allowed
6. Qualifying for Absentee Ballots
7. Possible Mail-in Ballot Voting Days
8. Accepting Late Ballots
9. Ballot Harvesting
10. Voter ID for Voting and Registration
11. Small Precincts
12. Paper Ballots
13. Fingers Marked
14. Manual or Machine Vote Counting
15. Routine Audits
16. Quick Results (in 2024)
17. Citizen access to voter rolls lists

2. Procedures for data gathering

- a. A team of five primary researchers from three countries were selected, who were attending the London School of Economics in the UK and Northwestern University in Illinois. These researchers have training in statistics, data analysis, history, economics, and world affairs.
- b. The research team was supervised by people experienced in research studies and analysis, and knowledgeable in the subject of elections, standards, models, frameworks, and in diplomacy and foreign relations.

3. Data gathering and verification

- a. First round: the study areas were divided equally among the surveyors, who examined government websites, national constitutions (where applicable), and other legal documents involving election laws and regulations.
- b. Second round: the work of each surveyor was then shifted to another member of the survey team who then reviewed and checked that work.
- c. Third round: the total body of data was then reviewed by the project director and two experts in the election integrity field.
- d. Fourth round: international election surveyed rules were then reviewed by organizations and people in those regions, for Latin America, Africa, Europe, Asia and Oceania. Data for the 50 US states and DC were reviewed by individuals in the US with specific knowledge of the states.
- e. Fifth round: the original survey team then adjusted where needed and then reviewed the survey yet another time.



4. Risk and compliance assessment

A scoring system was developed to compare risk and compliance assessment of election systems across the 17 risk areas for all US and foreign entities surveyed. This system produced a scale of 0 to 100 for a compliance score, where 0 was the lowest compliance and 100 was the highest. The scoring was in accordance with the 2005 Carter-Baker Commission grading system and the best practices of 75% of the nations surveyed, with scores created for the 17 risk areas studied.

5. Observations

Observations were made based on the data gathered, including score ranges for each of the 17 areas, the US states, and the 36 countries. Average scores were compiled for the US states, 36 countries, and five regions. The standard deviation was calculated for the US states and for the 36 countries. Comparison charts were developed for the US states, regions, and countries for each of the 17 risk areas.

6. Additional Verification

- a. The observations made were again reviewed by the supervising team for logic, consistency and for determination levels of relevance and importance.
- b. For the final review, a panel expert in elections, governments, research, and diplomacy reviewed the research, methodology and results for accuracy and logic. The panel also looked for outlier results, which were then re-examined and verified or corrected.

7. Conclusions

The Meyers Report (TMR) drew conclusions based on collected observations of the collated data, of interviews conducted with election experts, and from contributors in the different countries on six continents surveyed. TMR conducted causal analyses to determine the root causes of high election risk.

8. Recommendations

From the reviewed observations, conclusions were drawn, and recommendations were developed. A causal analysis was conducted to determine the root causes of high election risk.



9. Final report and review

The final report was then reviewed again before releasing the report. The report examines the risk gaps in each area and provides recommendations for improvement in the form of revisions to the procedures of surveyed items. This report is limited to the 17 risk areas surveyed. To conduct complete authorization and assessment, controls would have to be developed for the 646 processes in the US election system model and used to assess all processes for a complete gap analysis.

10. Notes

- a. There is significant variability of processes within a state based on the interpretation of state laws and policies by county and local (precinct) government. The state assessment score will be a composite of these processes.
- b. The survey used 17 risk areas to cover most threats to election processes. Due to time and resource constraints, this choice provides a high-level assessment in a reasonable time frame.
- c. The survey is designed so that it can be updated as laws/policies are changed, and that scoring and weighting factors can be updated as the process matures.



3. Scoring criteria

Election system risk areas and explanation of grading

Grading system

A weighted grading system (in accordance with the 2005 Carter-Baker Commission) was created for each of the variables (see explanation below) and then aggregated for a score for each surveyed governing entity ranging from 0 to 100 (with 100 being the highest). The weighted grading system was created by the supervisor team and election experts in accordance with the recommendations of the Carter-Baker Commission and the percentage of countries following the publicly identified procedures.

Grading and Observations

Upon completion and review of data gathering, observations were listed, and the grading formulas were applied to the surveyed areas in accordance with the established criteria, which became part of the observations.

Grading values

14 risk areas were weighted at a maximum of 5 points, with the three top risk areas at 10 points (mail-in ballots, Voter ID, and Voter roll access). This resulted in a maximum top score of 100. Points were awarded from 0 to 5 and 0 to 10 for the areas based on the amount of adherence to the risk area.

Scoring

Each state and each country were scored by adding points from the 17 risk areas to arrive at a total compliance score for the entity. The aggregate scoring goes from 0 (the lowest compliance/highest risk) election standards to 100 (highest compliance/lowest risk.)

We grouped U.S. and foreign compliance with secure election rules in three categories- Good (scores between 75 and 100); Marginal (scores between 65 74); and Failing (scores 64 and below). A "Good" rating is indicative of nations and states who have well established rules to protect against election fraud within the 17 risk areas. A "Marginal" rating is assigned for those nations and states who have mitigated election risks in some of the 17 areas, but who remain measurably vulnerable to election fraud. A "Failing" score reflects nations and states whose rules leave them seriously vulnerable to election fraud among multiple categories of risk.



4. Observations

4.1 Core Observations

General notes

- a. There is not a single election process model or election risk management framework agreed upon and in use by all states.
- b. The US average for all 50 states and DC is at 59.82 points.
- c. The average for all other nations surveyed is 81.19. The US is 21.37 points lower than the average of the 36 other nations surveyed.
- d. The average score of the 8 African nations surveyed was 88.25, or 28.27 points higher than the US average.
- e. In the US, the scores ranged from a low of 30 (Nevada) to a high of 83 (Mississippi).

Average scores comparison (US versus other nations)

The US average score for all 50 states and the District of Columbia was 60 points, with a median of 63. The average score of the other 36 nations surveyed was 82, and the median was 84. This puts the United States' average score 19.3 points lower than the 36 other nations surveyed, and the median US score (64) at 16 points lower.

Average scores comparison (US versus continent totals)

The average score of the 8 African nations surveyed was 88.3, which was 28 points higher than the US. The average score of the 8 Western European nations was 79.3, which was 19.1 points higher than the US. The average score of the 7 Eastern European nations was 79.7, which was 19.8 points higher than the US. The average score of the 8 Asian/Oceania nations was 79.8, which was 19.8 points higher than the US. The average score of the 5 Latin American nations was 85.2, which was 25.2 points higher than the US.

Average scores ranges

In the US, the scores ranged from a low of 30 (Nevada) to a high of 83 (Mississippi), a range of 53 points, while the 36 other surveyed nations ranged from 60 (Germany) to 95 (Kenya), a range of 35. The interquartile range of the 50 US states and the District of Columbia was 20.0, while the interquartile range of the 36 surveyed nations was 12.0, a full 8.0 points lower than that of the US.



Standard deviation comparison

The standard deviation of the scores for the US states and the District of Columbia was at 13.12, while the standard deviation of the scores for the 36 surveyed nations was at 8.99, or 4.22 points lower than that of the US.

Overall, we see a combination of greater average performance among the 36 surveyed nations than the United States, evidenced by the higher mean (81.50 vs 59.98), the higher median (84 vs 64), and greater consistency in the performance of the surveyed nations than among the United States. This is evidenced by a significantly lower interquartile range (12.0 vs 20.0) and lower standard deviation (8.99 vs 13.21).

The latter discrepancy is particularly striking when accounting for the fact that the US states are integrated into a single federalized governance system, whereas the surveyed nations are all politically independent of one another (with some exceptions of the European Union), yet their scores are far more consistent than those of the US states.



Comparison scores for the United States and for other nations




Figure 2 US Comparison Scores




Figure 3 Other Nation Scores

These grades shown were based on written (or in force) laws and regulations. The survey does not consider whether the governmental entities follow their own rules. This may account for why some totalitarian states such as Russia, China, and North Korea scored better, allowing them look like legitimate democratic republics.



4.2 General Observations

1. **“Citizens only” voting.** 75% of the other nations surveyed require citizens-only voting. However, another 8% allow non-citizens to vote subject to residency requirements of at least 5 years. Combined, these total 83%. Proof of citizenship and/or residency (where applicable) both require real documentation. In the US, 92.16% of the states restrict voting to citizens. However, except for Arizona, New Hampshire, and Wyoming, none truly requires proof of citizenship. However, while Arizona and Wyoming are tighter than the other states, there remain document requirement loopholes where non-citizens might be able to vote in federal elections. While some of the optional documentation validates citizenship, other acceptable alternatives do not. This appears to be a large loophole which can negate the “stated” intent. Based on the survey, the US is the only country that allows registration and voting using an “honor system.”
2. **Same Day Registration (SDR)** is prohibited in 97% of the countries surveyed. In the US, only 55% of the states do not have SDR. SDR makes it impossible for clerks and voter registrars to verify citizenship or the address of the proposed voters.
3. **Ranked Choice Voting (RCV).** 94% of the countries surveyed do not have RCV. The three that do allow it are North Korea, Australia and Ireland. In the US, 73% of the states do not have RCV, but 27% do allow it at least in some parts of their states.
4. **No In-person early voting.** 89% of the countries surveyed do not have early voting. In the US 8% do not have early in-person voting. However, 92% allow early voting.
5. **No Mail-in Ballots.** Of the 36 other nations surveyed, three (the UK, Ireland, and Japan) allow mail-in ballots, but only upon request and with reasons, which include being out of the country, physically disabled, etc. **The US is the only country surveyed that has states which allow unrestricted mail-in ballots.**

US state Grading Observations (50 states plus Washington, D.C.):

1. The average score for all the states, without adjusting for relative population, was 60.04 out of 100. This is the lowest score of any nation surveyed.
2. Only 4 states had “Good” scores: Mississippi (83), Arkansas (78), Kentucky (78), and Indiana (76).
3. 20 states scored 75-65 and are rated as “Marginal” in terms of best practices.”
4. 27 states have a failing grade and score 64 or lower.
5. The four highest state scores for election integrity averaged 78.75.
6. The next six states all scored 73, which is “Marginal.” These are Delaware, Kansas, Connecticut, Montana, Missouri and South Carolina.



7. The five lowest state scores averaged 35.4 (out of 100) for election integrity. The five lowest states are Nevada with 30, D.C. 36, Vermont 37, California 38, and Illinois 39. Based on written regulations and laws, these states had the worst scores of all 50 states (+DC), and all the 36 countries surveyed.
8. Of all the countries and regions surveyed, the US had the lowest “average” score, the lowest “median” score, the lowest “high” score, and the lowest “low score. Irrespective of how the comparisons are viewed, the clearest observation is that the US has a dangerously serious problem with our election system which needs to be remedied.

Africa Grading Observations:

1. Eight African states were surveyed and had an average score of 88, which is 27.8 points higher than the US average of all 50 US states plus Washington, D.C.
2. All eight of the African nations had passing grades.
3. The lowest African score was 84 and is a tie between Ethiopia, Morocco, and South Africa. No US state reached 84.
4. Kenya (and Mexico), both with a score of 95, were the highest of all 36 other countries and 50 states (plus D.C.) surveyed.
5. **Anecdotal note.** Based on interviews with native South Africans conducted by The Meyers Report, irrespective of the many problems of South Africa, the White leadership has faith in their election system. This is demonstrated by the ANC losing their majority in government. It also is shown with the rise of the Democratic Alliance Party, the second largest in South Africa. The Democratic Alliance Party is an amalgam of Whites, Blacks, and other minorities working to better their country.

Western Europe Grading Observations:

1. Eight Western European countries were surveyed and had an average score of 79.3, or 19.3 points higher than the US.
2. The three highest scoring countries were the Italy (90), France (88), and Sweden (84).
3. The lowest scoring country was Germany with 60, a failing grade.

Eastern Europe Grading Observations:

4. Seven Eastern European countries were surveyed and had an average score of 79.3, or 19.3 points higher than the US.
5. The two highest scoring Eastern European nations were the Albania and Bulgaria, both with scores of 87.



6. The two lowest scoring countries were Russia (70) and Poland (65). Even Russia scored higher than all but 17 US states.

Latin America Grading Observations:

1. Five Latin American countries surveyed averaged 85.2.
2. Latin America's average score was 25.2 points above the US average.
3. All Latin American countries had scores above 75, except Venezuela, with a score of 70 (an "Marginal" grade).

Asia and the Pacific Grading Observations:

1. Eight Asian and Pacific countries surveyed. All eight had an average election integrity score of 76.4 points, 14.4 higher than the US.
2. The highest scoring countries were South Korea (87) and India (87, the most populous country and the largest democracy), and Indonesia at 85.
3. Australia at 61 is the lowest of the Pacific countries.



5. Analysis

The following graphs show risk scores for the US and other nations for each of the 17 risk areas. Each graph has specific comments based on our review of that risk area.




Figure 4 Citizen-only voting




Figure 5 No SDR voting

I. Citizen-only voting.

1. 75% of the other nations require citizen-only voting. Two nations, Netherlands and Venezuela, require 5-10 years proven residency, for a total of 92% citizen-only voting or long-term residency.
2. Two nations, the UK and Australia, do not require citizenship.
3. 92% of the US states and the District of Columbia require citizenship, but do not verify or have loopholes preventing verification.
4. Maryland, Vermont and D.C. allow non-citizens to vote, even though this has been ruled unconstitutional.
5. Only New Hampshire verifies citizenship.

II. No SDR (Same-Day Registration) Voting

6. 97% of the other nations do not allow SDR voting. Poland allows same-day registration and voting with documentation.
7. 55% of the US states do not allow SDR voting; 45% (23 states) allow SDR.
8. North Dakota does not require registration, but voters must present ID at the polling place.
9. In Poland, voters can be added to election rolls on Election Day only if they present specific documentation proving their eligibility, such as residence confirmation, hospital discharge papers, or a valid Polish passport (for citizens abroad).




Figure 6 No ranked choice voting




Figure 7 No in-person early voting

III. No RCV (Ranked Choice Voting)

9. 94% of the other nations do not have RCV. Two nations, Ireland and Australia, allow RCV in some places.

10. 73% of the US states do not have RCV. 24% of states have RCV in some places.

11. As of this document's publication data, seven US states have legislation in progress that would ban RCV in their states.

IV. No In-Person Early Voting

12. 89% of the other nations do not allow mass early voting. 75% do not have early in-person voting, while 17%—Germany, Sweden, Ghana, Australia, Japan, and South Korea—allow in-person early voting under special circumstances.

11. 8% of the US states—Alabama, Mississippi, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania—do not allow in-person early voting. 92% of US states have in-person early voting. (If there is one day of early voting, it is considered a “grace period.”)




Figure 8 No mail-in ballots

V. No Mail-In Ballots

13. 94% of the other nations do not use mail-in ballots. Many allow requested absentee mail-ins, but with strong restrictions.
14. 27% of US states do not use mail-in ballots but allow mail-in absentee voting with strong restrictions. 73% of states allow mail-ins, either universally or by request.
15. 8 states (California, Colorado, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, Washington state) and the District of Columbia—18%—automatically mail an absentee ballot to every active registered voter.





Figure 9 Absentee ballot qualifications

VI. Absentee Ballot Qualifications

16. 83% of the other nations set specific qualifications on absentee ballots.
17. 27% of US states set specific qualifications on absentee ballots, 73% did not.
18. Illinois allows for a permanent requested ballot which does not adjust for those who move or die.
19. Many states allow permanent absentee ballot requests. Others allow a request to be made for primary that carries through general and run-off elections.

*Figure 10 Total mail-in ballot voting days*


VII. Total Mail-in Ballot Voting Days

19. 92% of the other nations do not have mail-in voting before the election. The United Kingdom accepts mail-in ballots for 12 days and Spain issues mail-in ballots 10 days before the election.

20. No US state prohibits mail-in voting.

21. For those Other nations which do allow mail-in ballots, the average time allowed is 5 days, with a high of 21 days.

22. For US states, the average time allowable for mail-in ballots is 36 days, with a high of 90 days.

*Figure 11 No Late Ballot Acceptance*

VIII. No Late Ballot Acceptance

21. 97% of the other nations do not accept late ballots. One nation, Sweden, accepts late mail-in ballots for three days.

22. 67% of US states do not accept late ballots, 33% DO accept late ballots anywhere from three to 21 days.




Figure 12 Ballot Harvesting

IX. Ballot Harvesting

23. 100% of the other nations do not permit ballot harvesting. Ghana and China allow proxy voting by close relations, which is far more secure than the ballot agents in many US states.

24. 45% of US states do not permit ballot harvesting.

25. The US is the only nation that allows any ballot harvesting.




Figure 13 Photo ID Requirements for Voting

X. Photo ID Requirements for Voting

25. 92% of the other nations have photo ID requirements.

26. 49% of US states have photo ID requirements.

27. In the US: (a) 49% require photo-IDs, (b) 21.5% require IDs which can be as little as a utility bill, (c) 29.4% have no ID requirement for voting.

Note: The US is the only country to have an honor system for voter ID requirements.




Figure 14 Small Precinct

XI. Small Precincts

27. 69% of the other nations have an average precinct size of fewer than 1,200 voters. However, 14% have medium sized precincts of 1,200 to 1,800.

28. 59% of US states have an average precinct size of fewer than 1,200 voters. However, 16% have medium sized precincts of 1,200 to 1,800.




Figure 15 Paper Ballots

XII. Paper Ballots

29. Of Other Nations, 81% only use paper ballots. Three nations, 8%, use a mix of paper and touch screen voting.

30. The Netherlands has exclusively used paper ballots since they were reintroduced in 2007 after security issues with Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) machines.

31. For US states, 65% use paper ballots only.

32. 31% of US states use a mix of paper ballots and touch screen DRE machines. DRE machines give voters a receipt of their vote, but there is no proof that the actual vote matches the receipt.

33. Only Louisiana primarily uses touch screen electronic voting statewide.




Figure 16 Fingers Marked

XIII. Fingers Marked

- 34. 39% of the other nations mark voters' finger(s).
- 35. 0% of US states mark voters' finger(s).
- 36. Uganda uses biometric scanners to prevent double-voting.




Figure 17 Manual or Machine Vote Counting

XIV. Manual or Machine Vote Counting (No touch screen electronic voting)

- 37. 91% of the other nations use manual and/or machine vote counting only.
- 38. 73% of US states use manual or machine vote counting only. However, 22% use a mix of manual, machine, and touch screen DRE counting.
- 39. Only Louisiana uses DRE touch screen voting statewide.




Figure 18 Routine Audits

XV. Routine Audits

39. 34% of the nations surveyed require routine post-election audits.

40. 86% of US states require routine post-election audits.

41. Despite US audits being more prevalent and because they are samplings, our election advisors have great doubt about their efficacy.




Figure 19 Quick Result Reception

XVI. Quick Result Reception (as of 2024)

41. 75% of the other nations announced election results within two days; 50% of the other nations announced election results within the same day.

42. 92% of US states announced election results within two days.

43. However, because 33% of states accept late ballots from anywhere from three to 21 days after election day, official results can be delayed for three weeks. Late ballots have flipped already “reported” election results.




Figure 20 Access to Voter Registration Rolls

XVII. Access to Voter Registration Rolls (and Cost If Any)

43. 75% of the other nations have voter rolls publicly available for free.

44. In Sweden, voter rolls are not publicly available, but public records contain the same information and are publicly available and searchable for free.

45. 20% of US states have voter rolls publicly available for free.

46. In the US, 90% of the states have access to full-state voter rolls for \$2,500 or less.

47. The Highest Costing Voter Registration Roll is provided by Alabama at \$32,000.

48. Currently, eight states are reported to have refused the DOJ's request with Voter Registration information. These include Arizona, Colorado, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.



6. Conclusions

The Meyers Report analysts developed conclusions based on observations of data and the interviews conducted with election experts and our contributors in the different countries surveyed. We conducted a causal analysis to determine the root causes of high election risk. The resulting analysis is outlined below:

1. The US is the only country to have an “honor” system for the citizenship, residency, and even personal identification in many circumstances when registering and voting. People applying for drivers licenses only need to check a citizenship block to be allowed to vote. Observers from other countries are surprised that we have election processes allowing an honor system in any part of the registration or voting procedure.
2. As a result of claims by federal government officials that have been amplified in the mainstream media, some citizens in the US believe that the election system is secure, which makes election fraud impossible. They believe that risk mitigation by other countries to reduce election fraud is not needed in the US election system.
3. Election systems risk varies from country to country, and from state to state in the US. Risk scores among US states vary far greater than scores from country to country. This indicates a lack of responsibility in securing certain US state election systems.
4. Average risk scores for the US were over 21 points below the average of all countries. This indicates a critical risk issue in all US state election systems.
5. There are no risk management frameworks currently in use to assess and secure election systems, as opposed to financial and computer systems.
6. From a statistical standpoint, the US states had a standard deviation of 13.21, compared to 8.99 for the 36 surveyed nations. This indicates a deliberate attempt to decrease compliance in many states. It underscores the effects of a lack of US Federal security guide rails, leading to compromise of election integrity in some states.
7. A causal analysis was conducted to determine the root causes of high election risk. The analysis concluded that election systems have been purposely designed to allow bad actors to adjust vote totals to have their candidates win instead of the citizens’ choice. This has been observed across all 17 risk domains.



7. Recommendations for Improvement

The following recommendations are proposed to address the root cause:

1. Develop a standard method of risk assessment for US election systems based on a risk management framework, and an election model based on the current NIST model of 2019.
2. Conduct risk assessments of all 50 states and identify gaps in the laws and policies of each state.
3. Determine the minimum standard for risk to secure election systems and codify that standard in a federal statute. This will provide “guide rails” to raise election integrity to a minimum acceptable level of risk.
4. Develop recommendations for improvement for the election risk areas. Provide these recommendations to all states to allow them the opportunity to improve their risk score. These recommendations should include the following: (a) changes in laws for the state legislatures, and (b) changes in policies and processes for the state governors and secretaries of state.
5. Develop standard compliance auditing procedures to provide periodic audits of election processes to accredit state systems in accordance with compliance with standards. This could be implemented as a national accreditation program with auditing standards.
6. Review the election practices of other countries to capture best practices and use them to improve the integrity of our election system.



8. Follow-on Recommendations

We recommend that follow-on studies be conducted to address risk areas beyond the 17 areas in this report.

Based on the identification of risks, we recommend that a standard set of controls be developed to continually assess election systems laws and procedures, and to provide recommended law and policy/process revisions to maintain a high degree of election integrity. Follow-on studies can be done in collaboration with other countries to benefit from their election best practices.

This study did not address auditing or the assurance that laws or procedures are being adhered to. We recommend that an auditing and enforcement program be developed to provide assurance of compliance with existing laws/procedures, and accreditation of state election systems.

This study did not compare country/state compliance scores to the political alignment of country/state executive and legislative bodies. There appears to be a possible correlation of scores to political alignment, but there are outliers in both directions. There is a possibility that the survey methodology could be refined to identify the propensity of a governing body to attain or keep non-compliant election rules.



Appendix A: Staff Acknowledgements

The following staff contributed to the research, development, and review of this report:

Survey and Study Team

Project Authors

Gary Meyers	Project Director
Edie Meyers	Executive Editor
Barry Chapman	Editor, Quality Control Editor
Jay Delancy	Editor and Survey Design

Research

Tharein Potuhera	Research Director
Gabe Frost	Researcher
James Bennett	Researcher
Peter Kim	Researcher
Vitesh Potuhera	Researcher

Data Review

Bob C. Genetski, Jr.	United States
Rob Brownsword	Europe and Asia
Woitech Berg	Poland
Stuart Morrison and Good Governance Africa	Africa
Carlos Legaspy	Latin America and Mexico

Peer Review Committee

Hal Daub, Former Congressman, Mayor
Paul McGonagle, Diplomat, international Banker and country risk expert.
Robert Genetski, Sr., Ph.D. Economist
James Womack, Election integrity
Bob J. Genetski, Jr., Clerk Allegan Co., MI
Chuck Gray, Wyoming Secretary of State

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Appendix B: Risk Areas and Grading System

The following 17 risk areas were selected based on an assessment of election system processes that posed the highest risk of compromise.

1. **Citizen-only voting** restricts voting to people who are legally allowed to vote and have a guaranteed stake in the country's future. Citizen-only voting helps mitigate the threat of foreign interference and validates the voting pool.
2. **Same Day Registration (SDR)** makes it impossible for election officials to verify anything about the voter, particularly address and other eligibility criteria. SDR makes it possible for people to vote more than once and in multiple locations without verification and crosschecking.
3. **Ranked Choice Voting (RCV)** is an overly complicated process at best. At worst, RCV can be manipulated and intentionally eliminate legal ballots, meaning that a candidate can win the election with only a small minority of support, and negate the true wishes of the electorate.
4. **Early voting** extends the voting process, which allows a greater opportunity for inefficiency at best and greater fraud opportunities at worst. It also robs voters of the opportunity to be knowledgeable of late breaking events.
5. **Mail-in ballots always break the chain of custody** and increase the risks of interception, forgery, coercion, ballot harvesting and other issues. Mail-in ballots can rob the voter of privacy and protection from coercion, depending upon who is, or is not, watching the voter fill out the ballot.
6. **Absentee ballots**, when distributed universally, without voter request, break the chain of custody, which is the bedrock of ballot and voting security. The longer the mail-in window, the greater the risk.
7. **Total voting days possible** including mail-in ballots, varies from 1 to 46 days.
8. **Accepting late ballots** is inherently counter intuitive and is rejected by 97% of the countries surveyed. Accepting late ballots allows the counting of fraudulent ballots and altering election results after the election is over.



9. **Ballot harvesting** breaks the chain of custody and increases the risk of coercion, fraud, and tampering, including throwing out votes for an opposition candidate.
10. **Voter ID** is required almost universally, as 32 of the 34 countries surveyed (or 94.1%) require voter ID. Only Australia and the UK varied.
11. **Small precincts** (1,200 voters or fewer) make it easier for voters and are easier to monitor and verify. For the Other nations surveyed, 69.4% have small precincts and 13.9% have medium-sized precincts of 1,200 to 1,800. For US states, 58.8% have small precincts, with another 15.7% being medium sized.
12. **Paper ballots** can be retained for recounts and audits. Electronic (digital) voting is subject to hacking and cannot be retained for recounts and audits.
13. **Marking fingers** prevents multiple voting on the same day.
14. **Manual or machine vote counting** with optical scanners and paper ballots marries a physical audit trail with the speed and convenience of machine counting.
15. **Routine audits** mitigate the chances of procedural errors, ensure accuracy, and increase public trust in election conduct. Audits, like recounts, should be available.
16. **Quick election results** reduce the window for fraud after the election and increase public confidence in the system.
17. **Public access to voter rolls** enables the public to verify voter rolls for ineligible voters as another public check on government. There are two ways to restrict access to the voter rolls. One is the price point. The other is by statute. For example, in some states and nations, distribution is limited to the candidates and parties. In Virginia, access is restricted to qualified persons or entities for specific purposes, and the information cannot be posted online in a searchable format or shared with third parties for such purposes. Thus, crowdsourced voter list research would be an illegal action. As a result, we decided to include a seven-point penalty to any state/nation that restricts access, with an overall minimum category score of zero. Free access to any voter is the gold standard.



Appendix C: Average and Comparison Scores




Figure 21 Average scores by continent

Average Scores by Continent

- Only the US** had an average failing grade for election rules best practices.
- Africa** scored highest. Our experts in Africa attributed this to these countries being former British colonies with those governmental concepts into their formalized governmental structures.
- Western Europe**, while priding itself on democratic institutions, even to the extent of the United States, nonetheless performed the second worst, though passing.
- Eastern Europe** performed slightly higher than Western Europe. Our experts theorize that the Eastern Europeans, having recently lived under the Soviet yoke, had greater value for their newly achieved democratic privileges than their Western European counterparts.
- Asia & Oceania** were slightly better than Europe.
- Latin America** scores second highest.




Figure 22 Average and high-low scores

Comparison of Scores by Continent and Country




Figure 23 Comparison Scores – Africa

Average, High, and Low Scores by Continent

a. The US has the lowest score in all categories for all regions surveyed.

Africa:

a. Africa had the highest average score of all the regions surveyed.

b. Africa's lowest individual score of 84 was higher than average US score of 60 and higher than the highest individual US state score, Mississippi's 83.

Latin America: Election Rules Comparison

Scoring: The Meyers Report

Source: ©2025 Meyers Report, Lincolnshire, IL




Figure 24 Comparison scores - Latin America

Latin America:

- Latin America had the second highest average (85.2) of all the regions surveyed.
- Latin America's lowest score (70 Venezuela) was higher than the US average of 60 and higher than all but 16 of the US states.
- Latin America's lowest score was the same as Russia.

Western Europe: Election Rules Comparison Scores

Scoring: The Meyers Report

Source: ©2025 The Meyers Report, Lincolnshire, IL




Figure 25 Comparison scores - Western Europe

Western Europe:

- Western Europe's average of 79.25 is 19.27 points higher than the US average of 60.
- The average scores of Western Europe and Eastern Europe are virtually the same.
- The three lowest scores of Western Europe are the UK (77), Ireland (75), and Germany (60), which was the only country in either Western or Eastern Europe that has a failing grade.





Figure 26 Comparison scores - Eastern Europe

Eastern Europe:

- Eastern Europe's average of 79.9 is 19.99 points higher than the US average of 60.
- The average scores of Western Europe and Eastern Europe are virtually the same.
- The three lowest scorers of Eastern Europe are the Czech Republic (82), Russia (70), and Poland (65).



Asia/Pacific:

- Asia and the Pacific had the second lowest average score (76) of the five regions surveyed.
- Asia and the Pacific's three lowest scores were Japan (71), China (68), and Australia (61), all of which were higher than the US average of 60. Other than the US, Australia and Germany were the only two countries surveyed to have failing grades.



Figure 27 Comparison scores - Asia/Pacific

Appendix D: Interviews

The following is a partial list of some experts in elections and the jurisdictions which were surveyed. There were others, many of whom are not named as a preference for privacy.

- **Interview.** Rob Hersov, " South Africa Today and Tomorrow, An Interview with Rob Hersov." Interviewer: Gary Meyers. For The Meyers Report, June 11, 2025.
- **Interview.** Rob Brownsword, "Discussion on voting rules for selected countries in Africa, Europe and Asia." Interviewer: Gary Meyers. For "The Meyers Report," July 13, 2025.
- **Interview.** Tom Setliff. "Discussion on voting rules for selected countries in select western states." Interviewer: Gary Meyers. For "The Meyers Report," July 13, 2025.
- **Interview.** Chuck Gray, Wyoming Secretary of State. "Voting rules for Wyoming and other states. Interviewer: Gary Meyers. "The Meyers Report." August 4, 2025.
- **Interview.** Willard Helander, election expert, former County Clerk, Lake County, IL., "Voting rules for Illinois, other states and legislation. Interviewer: Gary Meyers, "The Meyers Report," August 5, 2025.
- **Interview.** Bob J. Genetski, County Clerk of Allegan County, MI. "Voting rules for Michigan, other states and legislation. Interviewer: Gary Meyers, "The Meyers Report," August 5, 2025.
- **Interview.** Fred Hees, South African living in the US. "Voting rules for South Africa and other African nations. Interviewer: Gary Meyers, "The Meyers Report," August 4, 2025.
- **Interview.** Linda Paine, Election Integrity Project®California. "Election rules and practices in California and other states,". Interviewer: Gary Meyers, "The Meyers Report," August 4, 2025.
- **Interview.** Dr. Rick Richards. EagleAI NETwork, LLC "Election rules and practices and the state of voter registration rules and security throughout the US." Interviewer: Gary Meyers, "The Meyers Report," August 2, 2025.



- **Interview.** Marcell Strbich, Candidate for Ohio Secretary of State. “Election rules and practices in Ohio and other states,”. Interviewer: Gary Meyers, “The Meyers Report,” August 4, 2025.
- **Interview.** Unidentified Sitorus, Indonesian law student. “Indonesian election systems”. Interviewer: Tharein Potuhera, “The Meyers Report,” July 29, 2025.
- **Interview.** Mary Kirwan, Teacher. “Elections in Ireland”. Interviewer: Tharein Potuhera, “The Meyers Report,” August 11, 2025.
- **Interview.** Woitech Berg, Polish Attorney. “Elections in Poland”. Interviewer: Rob Brownsword, “The Meyers Report,” July 21, 2025.
- **Interview.** Rea Clemenina, citizen of Philippines. “Elections in Philippines”. Interviewer: Rob Brownsword, “The Meyers Report,” July 21, 2025.



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